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We use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over-
allocation that took place across European countries during the pilot phase (2005-2007)
of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Using a dynamic panel data model, we
estimate the counterfactual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU member states.
Comparing this baseline to allocated and veriﬁed emissions, we conclude that both over-
allocation and abatement occurred, along with under-allocation and emissions inﬂation.
Over the threetrading yearsofthe pilot phase weﬁnd over-allocationofapproximately 376
million EUAs (6%) and total abatement at the member state level of 107 Mt CO2 (1.8%).
However, due to over-allocation and possible uncertainty about future allocation method-
ologies, we calculate that emissions inﬂation of approximately 119 Mt CO2 (2%) occurred,
resulting in emissions over the pilot phase being approximately 12 Mt CO2 (0.2%) higher
than they would have been in the absence of the EU ETS.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C23, O13, Q54, Q58
Keywords: Emissions Trading Scheme, Climate Policy, Dynamic Panel Data Analysis.
1 Introduction
Since January 2005 over 10,000 ﬁrms involved primarily in electricity generation and heavy in-
dustry in the European Union have monitored, reported and veriﬁed their CO2 emissions as
participants in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the largest green-
house gas emissions trading program in the world. As the cornerstone of European climate
policy, the EU ETS is motivated by the economic theorythat market based policy tools encour-
age the development and adoption of pollution abatement technology and enable emissions
reductions more efﬁciently than command and control style regulation (Milliman and Prince,
1989; Jung,Krutilla,andBoyd, 1996). Theactionsrequiredtoreduceemissions aretheoretically
mobilized by the price on CO2 emissions, and emissions are reduced where the costs of doing
so are less than the costs of buying the permits. Pilot phase (2005-2007) European Union emis-
sions allowances (EUAs) were grandfathered freely to participating installations based on bur-
den sharing obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, past emissions, and economic projections
for the pilot phase trading period. According to Montgomery (1972), grandfathering should
notinterferewiththeefﬁciencyandperformanceofthesystem aswell-deﬁned propertyrights,
∗We would like to thank the Environmental Protection Agency of Ireland for providing funding for Barry Ander-
son’s research under the STRIVE program.
†Author for correspondence: corrado.dimaria@ucd.ie.
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and not the method of deliveringthose rights, should ensure an efﬁcient outcome. Excess sup-
ply of permits during the pilot phase caused the price of EUAs to collapse in 2006 and remain
close to zero throughout 2007. The excess of EUAs occurred either because emissions reduc-
tions (abatement) were much easier and cheaper than expected, or because too many EUAs
were distributed (over-allocation). While it is likely that some abatement occurred during the
pilot phase, over-allocation is also probable given the combination of voluntary (and largely
unveriﬁed) ﬁrm level data, and overly optimistic economic growth forecasts that were used to
form the cap for the entire trading system.
In this study we make use of ex post data and panel data econometric techniques to estimate
what emissions would have been in the absence of the EU ETS, referred to hereafter as the
counterfactualor business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) succinctly
explainthat“the counterfactualis notobserved and neverwill be. It can only be estimated, but
therearebetterand worse estimates andmuch can be done to narrowthe rangeof uncertainty,
particularly when the evaluation is done ex post when the levels of economic activity, weather,
energy prices and other factors affecting the demand for allowances are known.” Once credi-
ble estimates are established for BAU emissions, we can compare them to both allocated and
veriﬁed EUAs in order to gain insight into the occurrence of abatement and over-allocation in
the pilot phase.
Given the circumstances surrounding the pilot phase, there is a real possibility of ‘emissions
inﬂation’ where emissions under the EU ETS were higher during the pilot phase period than
they would have been otherwise. This is possible due to the methodology used for pilot phase
EUAallocation anduncertaintyaboutfuture(2008-2012) tradingperiodallocation methodolo-
gies. MostgovernmentsallocatedEUAsrelativetoexanteBAUprojections, withpastemissions
strongly inﬂuencing the more detailed distribution of allowances. EU ETS participants may
havelearnedthatinﬂating(historical) emissions leadsto more generous futureallocations and
if the prospect of future allowance distribution being contingent upon recent emissions (‘up-
dating’) is likely, there is a direct incentive to inﬂate actual emissions (See the discussion in
Grubb, Azar, and Persson, 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the EU ETS
pilot phase and reviews the existing literature; section 3 describes that data used, and presents
our econometric speciﬁcation. Estimation results and EU ETS pilot phase BAU estimates are
showninsection4, alongwithtestsforstructuralintegrityandrobustnesschecks, whilesection
5 concludes.
2 The EU ETS pilot phase and the relevant literature
Itispossible tobroadlysummarizedevelopmentsduringthepilotphaseoftheEUETSbyrefer-
ringtoFigure1, which shows theﬁnaldifferencesbetween allocatedandveriﬁedEUAsforeach
member state. Member states are shown on the vertical axis with gross long (allocated more
EUAs than required), gross short (shortfall between allocated EUAs and the required amount)
and net positions on the horizontal axis. In 2005, 2006 and 2007 the entire market was net long
by82.4(3.9%), 36.1(1.7%)and26.9(1.3%) million EUAs, respectively, accordingtotheCommu-
nity Independent Transaction Log (CITL). The net long ﬁnal positions of most member states
provides visual evidence of either net aggregate over-allocation or unexpected abatement. The
estimation of a credible BAU emissions scenario is thus necessary determine whether over-
allocation or “excessive” abatement lead to the excess supply of EUAs in the market. Similarly,
the comparison of BAU emissions to allocated and veriﬁed emissions data reveals the occur-
rence and location of under-allocation and also emissions inﬂation by member state.ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 3
Figure 1: Gross short/longpositionsfor 2005-2007 at the nationallevel (Kt CO2). Source: CITL
2.1 Relevantliterature on allocation and abatement
The literature on various aspects of the EU ETS is growing with much attention being paid to
allocationissues(EllermanandBuchner,2007;Neuhoff,Martinez,andSato,2006; Ahman,Bur-
traw, Krueger, and Zetterberg, 2007), competitiveness concerns (Demailly and Quirion, 2006,
2008; OberndorferandRennings, 2007; GrubbandNeuhoff,2006; Reinaud, 2004; Ponssard and
Walker, 2008), and the drivers of CO2 prices (Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor, 2007; Al-
berola, Chevallier, and Chèze, 2008). There are few published studies analyzing the levels of
abatement which might have occurred as a result of the emissions constraint and the resulting
CO2 price signal. We are aware of only two studies that make use of EU ETS and other data to
estimate BAU emissions as a step in identifying abatement. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) pro-
vide the only ex post analysis of the entire EU ETS and estimate levels of over-allocation and
abatement that occurred only during 2005-2006. An “allocation ratio” is constructed to signify
which countries were likely over-allocated based on the aggregated relative net/gross ﬁnal po-
sitions of their installations. The ratio of net short or long to gross short or long is calculated by
member state and the authors conclude that for 2005, fourteenmember states that distributed
72% of all EUAs cannot be viewed as being involved in over-allocation. As for the remaining
28% of EUAs, about 24% were required to cover emissions in 2005 so that the maximum over-
allocation is in theorderof 6%, or 125 million EUAs, assuming thatnoneof thelengthobserved
in these countries can be attributedto abatement or unexpected transient conditions that cre-
ated length in these years. Similar results hold for 2006. The authors use GDP growth trends,
national energy and CO2 intensity trends, and assumptions about structural breaks in these
trends to calculate BAU emissions and, as a result, ranges for levels of abatement. They con-ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 4
clude that between 130-200 Mt of CO2 were abated in 2005, and 140-220 Mt in 2006 for all
member states.
In an ex-post analysis of the largest sector in the EU ETS by share of emissions1 Delarue, Eller-
man, and D’haeseleer (2008) focus speciﬁcally on the European power sector possibilities for
short term CO2 abatement through fuel switching. Using both a non-calibrated and a histor-
ically calibrated simulation model the authors’ estimates of abatement are between 34.4 and
63.6 Mt in 2005, and 19.2 and 35 Mt in 2006 in the power sector alone. These abatement esti-
mates are based solely on the substitution effect of fuel switching and do not take into account
the income effect of emissions reductions resulting from industrial eletricity consumers be-
coming more efﬁcient due to the rise in electricity prices resulting from the pass through of
CO2 costs.2
In general, the views about levels of abatement, or the difference between BAU and veriﬁed
emissions, which likely occurred during the pilot phase can be summed up by contrasting two
insights. Kettner, Köppl, Schleicher, and Thenius (2008) conclude abatement played a minor
role in determining the ﬁnal net position of countries:
“...it is rather unlikely that the EU ETS has already created incentivesfor abatement investments
in the ﬁrst trading years. Given the rather low carbon prices, it is also extremely unlikely that
industries with a heavy CO2 cost component, such as cement and lime, have reduced their pro-
duction levels because of the stringency of allowances. In a few installationsthe option for a fuel
shift may have been used. Most probably the only reductionoption that was widely used was the
improved operation of existing equipment. The reduction potential of this option is, however,
rather limited.”
Incontrast,EllermanandBuchner(2008) explainwhytheconclusion ofsigniﬁcant earlyabate-
mentandasigniﬁcant gapbetweenBAUemissions andobservedemissions islogical andplau-
sible:
“...the refutable presumption must be that the EU ETS succeeded in abatingCO2 emissionsin its
ﬁrst two years based on three observations.
1. A signiﬁcantly positive EUA price. A signiﬁcant price was paid for CO2 in 2005-06, which
would have the effect of reducing emissionsas ﬁrms adjust to this new economic reality.
2. Risingreal output. Real output in the EU has been risingat the same time that the rate of im-
provement in CO2 intensity has been declining, which has led to rising CO2 emissions before
2005.
3. Historicalemissions data that indicate a reduction of emissions even after allowing for plau-
sible bias.”
There seem to be logical arguments in favor of either concluding that BAU emissions are very
similar to the observed veriﬁed emissions levels, or that abatement or inﬂation created a sig-
niﬁcant difference between the counterfactual and veriﬁed emissions. In the rest of the paper
we attempt to clarify this issue by estimating BAU emissions, and assess the previous claims.
We begin by describing the data and the econometric methodology used for our estimates of
BAU emissions for the pilot phase.
1According to the CITL, ’Combustion’ installations were allocated approximately 70% of pilot phase EUAs.
2Sijm, Neuhoff, and Chen (2006) ﬁnd the EUA cost pass-through rate was between 60-100% in Germany and
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3 Data and econometric speciﬁcation
3.1 Data
In order to calculate an emissions counterfactual for the EU ETS pilot phase we use historical
data on European industrialemissions, industrialeconomic activity levels, climate effects, and
energy prices. The historical and pilot phase period data for factors inﬂuencing levels of CO2
emissions (our dependent variable) are obtained from public data sources. However, the only
ﬁrmleveldataforEU ETSparticipantsfortheyearspriorto thetradingperiodarethehistorical
baseline emissions as supplied by ﬁrms which are aggregated and reported in National Alloca-
tion Plans (NAPs). This “baseline” period was generally around 2002 while different countries
allowed the use of different methodologies, such as averaging or dropping certain years, for
establishing a ‘reasonable’ historical baseline (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). A single historical
point does not allow for an econometric analysis and therefore we obtain historical emissions
data from Eurostat, and match historical emissions classiﬁed by NACE codes to the sectors
participating in the EU ETS.
Industrial CO2 emissions. Eurostat aggregates emissions according to NACE classiﬁcation of
the emitter. Based on these classiﬁcations, we have selected a subset of total national emis-
sions that we feel are most comparable to those sectors participating in the EU ETS. Table 1
outlines the process of matching historical emissions according to NACE classiﬁcations in Eu-
rostat to the sectors participating in the EU ETS as outlined in Annex 1 of the EU ETS Directive
(European Commission, 2003). Just as the EU ETS does not cover the entire economy, we have
chosen a subset of total CO2 emissions that we feel best represents emissions from those in-
dustries participating in the EU ETS. Hereafter, the chosen subset of emissions is referred to as
“Eurostat emissions”.
Eurostat emissions can be considered a reasonable proxy for historical EU ETS emissions only
if the matching process produces satisfactory data in termsof the absolute magnitude of emis-
sions by country, and if the ratio between Eurostat emissions and the (unobserved) historical
emissions of EU ETS ﬁrms is relatively constant over time. We use veriﬁed emissions data from
2005-2006 to analyze the quality of our chosen subset of total emissions from Eurostat. Table
2 displays Eurostat emissions, veriﬁed EU ETS emissions and the ratio of the two. A ratio close
to one is indicative of a good matching between NACE classiﬁcations in Eurostat and EU ETS
sectors. For most countries in both 2005 and 2006, the only years for which veriﬁed EU ETS
data and Eurostat emissions data exist, we feel the chosen subset of emissions is a good proxy
for EU ETS ﬁrms as most countries have ratios close to one. For the EU25 we feel the chosen
subset of Eurostat emissions is a strong ﬁt.
The last column in Table 2 contains the ratio of baseline emissions as reported in the NAPs
of each member state, and summarized by the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt,
2005), and Eurostat emissions. In countries where averaging was used to determine baseline
emissions, averages of Eurostat emissions were also used for the relevant years to ensure con-
sistency. These baseline ﬁgures are not veriﬁed data and, according to Ellerman and Buchner
(2007), the data collection effortwas largely a voluntarysubmission by the industries involved,
conducted under severe time pressures with a lack of desirable veriﬁcation. While industries
cooperated in submitting the relevant emissions data, it is clear that there was an incentive to
attempt to inﬂuence allocation by reporting inﬂated historical emissions. This point is high-
lighted by comparing the ratios for 2005 and 2006, to the baseline ratios. For example, Austrian
EU ETS baseline emissions were very close to Eurostat emissions in magnitude with a ratio of
1.009, but in the ﬁrst two years of trading, veriﬁed emissions were approximately 93-94% ofABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 6
Table 1: EU ETS and Eurostat emissions matching
Eurostat emissions sources Eurostat emissions categories EU ETS sectors (EC, 2003)
Fuel Combustion Public Electricity and Heat Combustion inst. > 20 MW
Production
Fuel Combustion Petroleum Reﬁning Mineral oil reﬁneries
Fuel Combustion Manufacture of Solid Fuels Coke ovens
and other energy industries Combustion inst. > 20 MW
Fuel Combustion Iron and steel Pig iron or steel
Fuel Combustion Non-Ferrous metals Metal ore (including sulphide ore)
roasting or sintering
Fuel Combustion Chemicals Cement, clinker and lime ion
Glass including glass ﬁbre
Ceramic products
Fuel Combustion Pulp, paper and print pulp from timber,
paper and board > 20 t/d
Fuel Combustion Food Processing, Beverages Combustion inst. > 20 MW
and Tobacco
Industrial Processes Metal production Pig iron or steel
Metal ore (including sulphide ore)
roasting or sintering
Industrial Processes Mineral production Cement, clinker and lime
Glass and ceramics
Source: Eurostatand European Commission (2003)
Eurostatemissions. EitherAustrianbaseline emissions datawere inﬂated, orthe EU ETS’ share
of Eurostat emissions is shrinking due to other economic factors. For most countries (18 out of
25), thehistoricalbaseline ratioishigherthantheveriﬁedemissions ratiosfor2005 and2006. It
is not unreasonable to assume historical inﬂation, given the clear incentives to do so for indus-
try and we are comfortable that the assumption of a relatively constant share of ETS industry
of the chosen industrial emissions does not invalidate the use of Eurostat emissions as a proxy
for historic EU ETS emissions. In order to make projections of emissions for 2007 we assume
that the EU ETS share of emissions in 2007 is the same as in 2006 since at the time of writing
Eurostat emissions data for 2007 was not available.
Industrial economic activity levels. Eurostat provides data on industrial production levels
by NACE classiﬁcation. Eurostat’s annual indices of production (working days adjusted) for
Mining and Quarrying (NACE C), Manufacturing (NACE D), Energy (NACE E), Total Industry
excluding construction (NACE C_D_E) and “Total industry excluding construction and the en-
ergy sector” are considered as potential indicators of the economic activity levels for the EU
ETSsectors. Based on theactivities of EU ETS ﬁrmsas outlined in Annex1of theEU ETS Direc-
tive(EuropeanCommission,2003)bothindicesofeconomicactivityforthemanufacturingandABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 7
Table 2: EU ETS veriﬁed emissions and Eurostat emissions (Kt CO2)
2005 2006 Historical
Country Eurostat Veriﬁed EUAs Ratio Eurostat Veriﬁed EUAs Ratio Ratio
A B =B/A C D =D/C
AT 35,598 33,373 0.937 34,962 32,383 0.926 1.009
BE 56,770 55,363 0.975 55,253 54,775 0.991 1.081
CY 4,416 5,079 1.150 4,608 5,259 1.141 1.021
CZ 83,411 82,455 0.989 86,744 83,625 0.964 1.261
DE 441,661 474,991 1.075 444,580 478,017 1.075 1.152
DK 26,253 26,476 1.009 33,547 34,200 1.019 1.002
EE 13,219 12,622 0.955 12,573 12,109 0.963 0.985
ES 183,219 183,627 1.002 174,270 179,697 1.031 1.054
FI 34,081 33,100 0.971 45,296 44,621 0.985 0.974
FR 137,844 131,264 0.952 131,409 126,979 0.966 1.066
GR 69,472 71,268 1.026 66,364 69,965 1.054 1.036
HU 29,612 26,162 0.883 29,653 25,846 0.872 0.928
IE 21,298 22,441 1.054 20,305 21,705 1.069 0.966
IT 224,965 225,989 1.005 225,186 227,439 1.010 1.065
LT 6,727 6,604 0.982 6,410 6,517 1.017 0.989
LU 2,338 2,603 1.113 2,491 2,713 1.089 1.213
LV 2,861 2,854 0.997 2,912 2,941 1.010 1.102
MT 1,960 1,971 1.006 1,976 1,986 1.005 1.014
NL 92,344 80,351 0.870 87,555 76,701 0.876 0.888
PL 213,054 203,150 0.954 223,631 209,616 0.937 1.004
PT 33,204 36,426 1.097 30,292 33,084 1.092 1.096
SE 21,325 19,382 0.909 20,876 19,889 0.953 0.972
SI 8,451 8,721 1.032 8,424 8,842 1.050 1.170
SK 24,640 25,232 1.024 24,867 25,543 1.027 1.083
UK 241,016 242,513 1.006 245,920 251,160 1.021 1.155
EU25 2,009,739 2,014,017 1.002 2,020,104 2,035,612 1.008 1.051
Source: Eurostat,DEHSt (2005), CITL and own calculations
energy sectors are used in the analysis. While these indices are likely to also include ﬁrms and
industries not covered under the EU ETS, we feel them to be good indicators of the economic
activity levels of EU ETS industries. As a robustness check, alternative indices are also used in
a separate analysis, whose results are discussed in Section 4.2. All indices are normalized such
that the 2005 level equals 100 for each member state.
Climate factors. Eurostat contains variables for annual heating degree days for each mem-
ber state from 1990 onwards. Heating degree days are calculated as the difference between the
daily mean temperature and 18 degrees Celsius, the ’heating threshold’. Each day with an av-
erage temperature below 18 degrees contributes to the annual total of heating degree days. A
variable for cooling degree days is created using data from the European Climate and Assess-
ment Database3 (ECA&D) where daily mean temperature above 18 degrees contribute to an
annual measure of cooling degree days. Precipitation data was also extracted from the ECA&D
andused tocreateanannualprecipitationvariableforeachcountryasprecipitationmayaffect
acountry’sability togenerate hydro electricity, iftheyhavesigniﬁcant hydro generation capac-
ity. With high precipitation levels, the possibility of producing hydroelectricity is larger, mak-
3See http://eca.knmi.nl/.ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 8
ing it easier to switch energy production from an intensive emission source to a non-intensive
emission one. As a consequence, a reduction of real emissions could take place Mansanet-
Bataller, Pardo, and Valor (2007). Wherever data are missing in the ECA&D, observations from
www.tutiempo.net are used to ﬁll the gaps.
Electrical energy prices. Fossil fuel prices play an important role in determining CO2 emis-
sions in both the short run – due to the substitution effect of fuel switching from emissions
intensive fuels to less intensive alternatives (Delarue, Voorspools, and D’haeseleer, 2008; De-
larue and D’haeseleer, 2007) – and the long run, through the income effect and the process
of directed technical change. Ideally, prices for various fossil fuels used for energy production
would be included as explanatory variables in our analysis. However, we do not use multiple
fossil fuel prices as predictor variables for two reasons: ﬁrst, a lack of data for different fuel
prices for EU member states over the study period, and second, econometric difﬁculties of in-
cluding multiple fuel price variables that are likely highly correlated. Due to these issues, we
have decided to include a variable for the price of electrical energy for industrial customers in
EU member states as provided by Eurostat. Using this variable is imperfect as it does not ex-
plicitly capture the effects on emissions from fuel switching, but it does offer some insight into
the effect of energy prices on induced technical change and CO2 emissions.
EU ETS data. The Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) is the deﬁnitive EU ETS
resource created by the European Commission and contains all records of issuance, transfer,
cancelation, retirement and banking of allowances that take place in the registry. The data in
the registry was viewed and extracted using the CITL Viewer courtesy the European Environ-
mental Agency.4
3.2 EconometricSpeciﬁcation
We use dynamic panel data estimation techniques to estimate an econometric equation for
industrialCO2 emissions (Eurostat emissions). Dynamic models have been commonly used in
energy economics to study the demand for electricity, natural gas or other sources of energy.
Such studies often use a version of the ﬂow adjustment model from Houthakker, Verleger, and
Sheehan (1974) where the dependent variable is the quantity of the variable of interest, and a
lagged dependent variable, price, and other explanatory variables are on the right hand side
of the equation. While the purpose of our study is different from those demand studies, the
methods employed are similar. The main difference between our study and energy demand
studies is the price variable for electrical energy for industrial users as an explanatory variable
instead of a price for CO2 emissions.
The constructed panel data set is unbalanced as some countries are missing data for the early
part of our study period. The missing observations primarily occur in eastern European coun-
tries that would eventually join the European Union. The existence of systematic missing ob-
servations and the N ×T dimensions of the constructed data set lead us to the bias corrected
least squared dummy variable (LSDVC) estimation techniques as prescribed in Bruno (2005b).
Instrumentalvariable (IV) and General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimators
as proposed in Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998)arealsoconsidered, butLSDVCtechniquesarepreferredasIVandGMMestimatorprop-
erties hold for data sets with large N, but can be severely biased and imprecise in panel data
with a small number of cross-sectional units (Bruno, 2005a). Judson and Owen (1999) and Bun
4TheCITLviewerisavailableathttp://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/atlas/viewdata/viewpub.asp?id=3529.ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 9
and Kiviet (2003) also prove the virtues of least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimation in
small N panels that are common in macroeconomic studies, but only for the case of balanced
paneldata sets. Bruno’s (2005b) LSDVC estimator is adapted for the case of unbalanced panels
and is deemed the most appropriateestimation technique given the characteristics of our data
set. LSDVCestimatorsarecalculatedusingthealgorithmoutlinedin(Bruno,2005a)wherecon-
sistent estimators are initially calculated using either GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell
and Bond, 1998) or IV (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982) methods as a ﬁrst step, and these estimators
are then used to initiate a second step where bias in the consistent IV or GMM estimators is
corrected to surrender the ﬁnal bias-corrected parameter estimates.
We use an unbalanced panel data set consisting of 25 countries5 over the period 1990-2007 to
estimate the following equation:
CO2it =β1CO2it−1 +β2econ_Dit +β3econ_Eit +β4electit +β5hddit +β6cddit ++β7rainit +ui +eit,
Where CO2 is Eurostat emissions, econ_D and econ_E are Eurostat’s indices of production
for the Manufacturing and Energy sectors, respectively, elect is the price of electrical energy
for industrial customers, hdd and cdd are heating and cooling degree days, rain is an annual
measure of precipitation, u is the country ﬁxed effect, and e is the idiosyncratic error term. We
calculate Arellano and Bond (1991) estimators in the ﬁrst step of the LSDVC algorithm and in-
clude time dummies based on the requirement that ‘ﬁrst step’ estimators must be consistent
in order to initialize the bias correcting second step. We initially included time period dum-
mies based on the recommendation of (Roodman, 2006) when calculating Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimators but joint insigniﬁcance of the time dummies along with stronger model per-
formance (as a predictor) without dummies, led us to repeat the analysis with time dummies





where Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB hereafter) estimators are generated in the ﬁrst step to ini-
tiate bias correction in the second step of the algorithm. Table 3 gives the estimation results
for two speciﬁcations: equation (1) on the left of the table is the original estimation, and equa-
tion (2) contains interaction variables that allow us to perform a Chow test for the structural
integrity of the parameters over the study period. The results of the Chow test are discussed
furtherin Section 4.2
The signiﬁcance of the lagged dependent variable is as expected in Equation (1), and is of sim-
ilar magnitude to the lagged dependent variable coefﬁcients in Kamerschen and Porter (2004)
but slightly smaller than those for the industrial energy demand equation in Considine (2000).
The signs and statistical signiﬁcance of the economic variables for the energy and manufac-
turing sectors are also not surprising as a major source of emissions in manufacturing is from
electrical energy consumption, while only a small portion of manufacturing emissions arise
from industrial processes. This is reﬂected in the positive but statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁ-
cient on NACE_D coupled with strong signiﬁcance of the NACE_E parameter estimate. The
5Romania and Bulgaria are excluded from the analysis as they joined the scheme in 2007, and there are issues
concerningtheir EU ETS and historicaldata.ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 10
Table 3: Estimation Results
Equation (1) (2)
Coeff. St. Err Coeff. St. Err
CO2t−1 0.6542*** (0.0710) 0.6525*** (0.0723)
NACE_D 0.0076 (0.0439) 0.0135 (0.0523)
NACE_E 0.2336*** (0.0688) 0.2649*** (0.0859)
elect -0.0371 (0.0511) -0.0057 (0.0578)
hdd 0.0875 (0.0839) 0.0843 (0.0846)
cdd 0.0094 (0.0108) 0.0098 (0.0106)





Number of observations= 251, Number of groups = 25.
Notes: ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level;
Joint test for signiﬁcance of interaction and euets terms: χ2(4) = 5.56,
Prob > χ2 = 0.2349.
coefﬁcient estimate on the electrical energy price variable is of the expected sign but lacks sta-
tistical signiﬁcance, likely due to the fact that substitution between (energy and non-energy)
factors of production according to relative prices is not an immediate process.
The climate variables for heating and cooling degree days are not statistically signiﬁcant and
these results are similar to those found in earlier industrial energy demand studies by Polemis
(2007) andKamerschenandPorter(2004). Thisstudyfocuses onlyonindustrialemissions, and
notresidentialortotalnationalemissions. Ifthefocuswereshiftedtoresidentialorcommercial
emissions, or emissions arising solely from the electricity sector, climatic variables would be
expected to grow both in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance, as found in Considine (2000)
and Pardo, Meneu, and Valor (2002). The coefﬁcient on the precipitation variable is of the
expectedsign, butlacks statistical signiﬁcance; thisis reasonable asnot allmember stateshave
considerable hydro power capacity in their utility mix and as a result, precipitation levels are
not expected to have an effect on CO2 across all countries.
4.2 Parameterstability and robustness checks
It possible that the parameter estimates displayed in equation (1) of Table 3 are not stable over
the study period, due to a structural break caused by the the start of the EU ETS in 2005. We
perform a Chow test for structural change of parameters across time as explained in (Wool-
ridge, 1999) to test if a structural break occurred as a result of the presence of the EU ETS. We
create a dummy variable (called ‘euets’)that takes a value of 1 for 2005-2007 and 0 for the pre-
vious years for all countries. The dummy is interacted with the economic activity variables for
manufacturing and energy sectors and the price of electrical energy for industrial consumers,
and the joint signiﬁcance of the interaction terms is tested.
Given the value of the test statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of euets and the interaction terms,
and the associated probability value (Prob > χ2 = 0.2349), we cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis of no structural break, and conclude that the existence of the EU ETS did not signiﬁcantlyABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 11
change the relationship between the level of CO2 emissions, and the potentially endogenous
explanatoryvariables. Thisﬁndingisin linewiththeliteratureontheEUETSandEUindustrial
“competitiveness”. In an ex-ante study Reinaud (2004) concludes that the cost impacts of the
EU ETS on some key industrial sectors are not likely to lead to major negative impacts on the
competitiveness in the near term.6 Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) use German ﬁrm level data
to empirically support the same conclusion of no economic disadvantage to EU ETS ﬁrms in
the pilot phase by econometrically examining EU ETS ﬁrms’ revenues and employment levels.
Most of the competitiveness concernsassociated with the EU ETS were focused on sectors that
participatedinglobalmarketswithcompetitorsthatdidnotfaceemissionsconstraints, suchas
iron/steel and the cement industry. The iron and steel industry experienced weak production
losses and proﬁtability losses – as measured by changes in EBITDA7 – are likely to be positive
given the level of free allocation in the pilot phase (Demailly and Quirion, 2008). Demailly and
Quirion(2006) conclude thatgiven thepilot phaseallocations, neithertheproduction levelnor
the EBITDA of the European cement industry is signiﬁcantly impacted, even for a very high
CO2 price. In an ex-ante study, Smale, Hartley, Hepburn, Ward, and Grubb (2006) have similar
ﬁndings where most UK participating sectors (cement, newsprint, petroleum, steel and alu-
minum) would be expected to proﬁt in general, although with a modest loss of market share in
the case of steel and cement, and closures in the case of aluminum.
While it is imperative that the econometric estimation give results that are in line with a priori
expectations in terms of coefﬁcient sign and signiﬁcance, the purpose of our estimation is not
to draw inference from parameterestimates, but to calculate in-sample projections for EU ETS
CO2 emissions. Accordingly, we compare ﬁttedvaluesfromtheabovespeciﬁcation toobserved
emissions data in order to analyze the model’s performance as a tool for predicting national
emissions. The high level of correlation (0.9992) between past emissions and ﬁtted values from
ourmodel gives usconﬁdence thatour speciﬁcation is appropriateforcalculating EU ETS BAU
emissions.
To verify the robustness of our results, we repeat the analysis using different indices of indus-
trial production as indicators of economic activity, and different dynamic panel data estima-
torstoinitialize biascorrectionandcomputeLSDVCestimators. Thedifferentindicesarethose
explainedinsection 3, whileAB, AndersonandHsiao (1982) andBlundellandBond (1998) esti-
mators are used as ﬁrst step estimators for each economic index. We judge the performance of
the alternativespeciﬁcations based on the correlation and variance between ﬁtted values from
the model and observed values. We conclude that the speciﬁcation using AB estimators to ini-
tialize bias correction, and NACE_D and NACE_E as economic variables performs strongest
as a prediction tool.8
4.3 Pilot PhaseProjections
Pilot phase BAU emissions are calculated by taking the projections for industrial CO2 emis-
sions and multiplying that by the percentage of Eurostat emissions that are attributable to the
ETS sectors as shown in Table 2. For example, Austria’s EU ETS BAU emissions for 2005 are
calculated as follows:
EU ETS BAU emissions are compared to allocated and veriﬁed EUA’s to determine the levels
of misallocation, abatement and emissions inﬂation in each member state for each year. For
6Reinaud (2004) deﬁnes competitiveness losses as a loss of output through CO2 leakage while considering the
effects of CO2 costs pass through, allocation and market structure.
7EarningsBefore Interest Taxes Depreciationand Amortization
8The full results of these robustnesstests are available from the authors upon request.ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 12
Table 4: Calculating EU ETS projected emissions for Austria, 2005 (Kt CO2)
Year Allocated Veriﬁed Eurostat CO2 Projection Ratioa EU ETS BAU
A B C D E=B/C F =E∗D
2005 32,413 33,373 35,598 35,158 0.937 32,960
Source: Own Calculations on NAPs, CITL and Eurostatdata.
Notes: a. as shown in Table 2
example,in2005Austriaexperiencedemissionsinﬂationof413KtCO2 (33,373-32,960)ofemis-
sions inﬂation, and zero tonnes of abatement since veriﬁed EUAs are greater than the EU ETS
BAU estimate. Continuing with allocation, Austrian ﬁrms were under-allocated 547 thousand
(32,960-32,413) EUAs with no over-allocation occurring since the amount of allocated EUAs
is less than the BAU level. Calculations for each member state by year for the levels of mis-
allocation, abatement and emissions inﬂation are displayed in Appendix A, but we provide a
summary for the EU25 in Table 5 in order to conserve space9. The third column in Table 5
contains our estimate of BAU emissions for EU25 member states over the pilot phase period.
In 2005 and 2006 there was net abatement of 30.4 and 1.2 Mt CO2 with 43.8 Mt CO2 of net in-
ﬂation in 2007 likely due to the price collapse of EUAs. In 2005, 2006 and 2007 there was net
over-allocation of the whole system of 52, 34.9 and 71 million EUA’s respectively.
Table 5: Summary of observed vs. BAU emissions for EU25 Mt CO2
Year Allocated Veriﬁed BAU Abatement Inﬂation Over-all. Under-all.
EU25 2005 2,096.4 2,014.0 2,044.4 46.7 16.3 109.2 57.2
EU25 2006 2,071.7 2,035.6 2,036.9 37.1 35.8 123.6 88.7
EU25 2007 2,078.7 2,051.5 2,007.8 23.5 67.2 143.2 72.2
EU25 2005-7 6,246.9 6,101.2 6,089.1 107.2 119.3 376.0 218.2
Source: Own Calculations on NAPs, CITL and Eurostatdata.
5 Discussion
The goal of this paper is to perform an ex-post evaluation of the pilot trading period and es-
timate a credible BAU emissions scenario for EU member states. Comparing the BAU to allo-
cated and veriﬁed EUAs allows us to identify any misallocation, abatement and/or emissions
inﬂation that may have occurred. The quantitative ﬁndings of this study, i.e. 2% emissions
inﬂation and 6% over-allocation at the EU25 level, refer to the pilot phase of the EU ETS and
cannot thus be generalized to other emissions trading programs. The details regarding alloca-
tion methodologies, and uncertainty about the future of European climate policy are unique
to this policy. Our quantitative results are only intended to give insights into the overall perfor-
mance of the EU ETS in the pilot phase under its unique circumstances.
In Table 6 we compare our estimates to those of Ellerman and Buchner (2008), the only study
that estimates abatement and over-allocation for the whole trading system. For 2005-2006 the
9As with any econometric exercise, there is a certain level of uncertainty in our parameter and BAU estimates.
However, errors operate in both directions and we have no reason to believe that our parameter or BAU estimates
containsigniﬁcantsystematicbias. WhileyearlyBAUestimatesmightbestrongerforsomememberstatesthanoth-
ers, we feel the aggregate of the estimates is a credible estimate for EU25 BAU emissions given the high correlation
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over-allocation numbers are comparable. But the abatement estimates are much higher in the
Ellermanand Buchner(2008) studyasa result of thetiming of theirstudy, thedataand analytic
techniques used to estimate the counterfactual. For the most part, Ellerman and Buchner use
national level data for economic activity, carbon intensity, and energy intensity. The country
level trends are compared with industry speciﬁc data and the authors assume that there is suf-
ﬁcient correlation to rely on national level data. Due to timing, our study beneﬁts instead from
the availability of ex post data, and we feel that our estimates of BAU emissions, and the re-
sulting gross abatement calculations are a reﬁnement of those in Ellerman and Buchner (2008)
thanks to the use of econometric techniques, industry level data on emissions, economic ac-
tivity, electric energy prices and climate factors.
Table 6: Comparison with Ellerman and Buchner (2008) (Mt CO2)
Year Ellerman and Buchner (2008) Anderson and Di Maria (2009)
Over-Alloc. Abatement Gross Net Gross Net Abatement
Over-Alloc. Over-Alloc. Abatement
2005 ≤125 130-200 109 52 47 30
2006 ≤125 140-220 124 35 37 1
2007 – – 143 71 23 -44
Source: Ellerman and Buchner (2008), and own calculations.
Note: Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
The results of our analysis highlight the importance of reliable and accurate data when de-
signing an emissions trading scheme to create incentives to reduce emissions. By observing in
Table 2 that 18 of 25 member states have higher ratios of Eurostat emissions to EU ETS emis-
sions in the baseline period than in the pilot phase, we are forced to question the integrity of
the historical baseline data. Table 7 displays the average veriﬁed emissions by member state,
our EU ETS BAU emissions estimates, and the BAU projections from the NAPs as reported by
the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt, 2005). The last column in Table 7 is the per-
centage of emissions reductions achieved by each member state, if we consider the ex ante
BAU emissions from the NAPs accurate and trustworthy. We must either conclude that 15 of
the 25 member states achieved double digit percentage reductions in emissions and the pilot
phase wasverysuccessful, or thatthe ex-anteprojections of pilot phase BAU emissions were of
questionable quality.
Whenquestionable baseline dataiscombined with overly optimistic ex-anteeconomic projec-
tions, the likely result is inﬂated BAU emissions projections and almost certainly permit misal-
location. Misallocation (including over-allocation) undoubtedly leads to equity issues, market
distortions and perverseincentives when it comes to reducing emissions, which is the primary
objective of any emissions trading scheme.
It appears the European Commission learned its lesson during the pilot phase and amend-
ments to the original EU ETS Directive were adopted by the European Commission in January,
2008.10 The main changes in EU ETS design are a clearly announced move towards increased
auctioning of allowances, dismissal of NAPs, and a tightening of the overall cap from 2013 en
route to a target of 21% reduction below 2005 veriﬁed EU ETS levels. Auctioning, combined
with top down cap formation is necessary so that distortions arising from free-riding incen-
tives for both industries and governments in the generation of projections do not repeat them-
selves. From2013onwards, itappearsthatanystrategicbehaviourcarriedoutintheearlyyears
10See adopted text at http://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/atlas/viewdata/viewpub.asp?id=3529ABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 14
Table 7: NAP projections and veriﬁed EUAs (Mt CO2)
Country Ave. vfd. EUAs Anderson et al. (2009) NAP BAU Ave. % Difference veriﬁed
BAU Ave. (DEHSt, 2005) EUA and NAP BAU (%)
AT 32.5 33.0 34.7 6.8
BE 54.3 57.7 64 17.9
CY 5.2 5.4 5.7 9.6
CZ 84.6 85.0 103.7 22.6
DE 480 474.2 499 4.0
DK 30 30.5 39.3 31.0
EE 13.4 13.0 14 4.5
ES 183.2 177.9 181.6 -0.9
FI 40.1 41.3 46.6 16.2
FR 128.3 131.2 163.8 27.7
GR 71.3 73.0 76 6.6
HU 26.3 26.7 31.3 19.0
IE 21.8 22.9 23 5.5
IT 226.6 232.9 244.5 7.9
LT 6.4 6.5 14 118.8
LU 2.6 2.4 3.7 42.3
LV 2.9 2.9 4.4 51.7
MT 1.3 2.0 2.9 123.1
NL 79 78.5 98.6 24.8
PL 207.5 205.6 263 26.7
PT 33.6 35.4 38.9 15.8
SE 18.2 20.2 26.6 46.2
SI 8.9 8.8 9.5 6.7
SK 25.1 25.2 36.2 44.2
UK 250.1 237.4 267.3 6.9
EU25 2033.2 2029.7 2292.3 12.7
Source: Own Calculations on NAPs, CITL and DEHSt (2005).
of trading will have a muted effect as only ﬁrms that are exposed to international competition
will be awarded partial free allocations.
At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that any rewards will be gained by strategic activities in
thesecond phase(2008-2012) oftrading. While thefactthat2005 veriﬁedEUETSemissions are
above our corresponding BAU estimates for 16 of the 25 member states (See Appendix A) sup-
ports our claim that at least some strategic behavior was rewarded, as 2005 veriﬁed emissions
data was used for the 2008-2012 allocation process, it is doubtful that beneﬁts are accruing to
any ﬁrm. Indeed, as the recession in Europe continues to deepen and industrial activity falls
there is much downward pressure on EUA prices. The dramatic difference between the pro-
jected economic pathat the time of 2008-2012 allowance allocation, and the current economic
circumstances has altered the emissions trading landscape in the short term, and allocations
that may have been somewhat of a strategic reward, are likely to have little value in the current
economic environment.
Variouscountries of the world are in the process of designing climate change policy with emis-
sions trading as a key feature. The most prominent is the United States where cap and trade
is already occurring at the regional level with the likelihood of federal legislation growing con-
stantly as support spreads from environmental groups, to some companies and other non-
traditional sources such as religious groups (Stavins, 2008). As the one of the largest emittersABATEMENT AND ALLOCATION 15
in the world11, U.S. climate change policy is important due to the magnitude of its emissions,
but also in political terms. Credible climate policy leading to a reasonable CO2 price in the U.S.
is a necessary step towards the sort of global agreement that is likely required to deal with the
global nature of climate change. We would like to conclude summarizing the main insights of
ourstudyfortradingschemesbeyond theEUETS.Ouranalysispointsatthreekeyelementsfor
the success of an emissions trading scheme: ﬁrst, we highlight the necessity of reliable emis-
sions data to establish a sound footing for the construction of the BAU scenario; second, our
discussion of the incentives for member states and industry, implies that a system of central-
ized cap setting (top-down) is less prone to produce lax caps and to lead to overallocation;
ﬁnally, auctioning allowances, by limiting the possibility of windfall gains for the participants
in the scheme is likely to reduce strategic behaviour, and rent seeking.
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A Full Output
Table A.1: Summary of observed vs. BAU emissions for EU25 countries, 2005-2007 (Mt CO2)
Country Year Allocated Veriﬁed BAU Abatement Inﬂation Over-all. Under-all.
AT 2005 32,413 33,373 32,960 - 413 - 547
BE 2005 58,310 55,363 58,506 3,143 - - 196
CY 2005 5,471 5,079 5,482 403 - - 11
CZ 2005 96,920 82,455 85,214 2,759 - 11,706 -
DE 2005 493,482 474,991 482,935 7,944 - 10,547 -
DK 2005 37,304 26,476 30,661 4,185 - 6,643 -
EE 2005 16,747 12,622 13,297 675 - 3,450 -
ES 2005 172,161 183,627 173,689 - 9,938 - 1,528
FI 2005 44,666 33,100 42,471 9,371 - 2,195 -
FR 2005 150,412 131,264 131,269 5 - 19,143 -
GR 2005 71,162 71,268 72,311 1,043 - - 1,149
HU 2005 30,236 26,162 27,132 970 - 3,104 -
IE 2005 19,237 22,441 22,874 433 - - 3,637
IT 2005 216,150 225,989 234,257 8,268 - - 18,107
LT 2005 13,499 6,604 6,477 - 127 7,022 -
LU 2005 3,229 2,603 2,463 - 140 766 -
LV 2005 4,070 2,854 2,828 - 26 1,242 -
MT 2005 2,086 1,971 1,992 21 - 94 -
NL 2005 86,452 80,351 80,831 480 - 5,621 -
PL 2005 237,558 203,150 208,200 5,050 - 29,358 -
PT 2005 36,909 36,426 35,174 - 1,252 1,735 -
SE 2005 22,289 19,382 20,754 1,372 - 1,535 -
SI 2005 9,138 8,721 8,803 82 - 335 -
SK 2005 30,471 25,232 25,769 537 - 4,702 -
UK 2005 206,072 242,513 238,104 - 4,409 - 32,032
EU25 2005 2,096,444 2,014,017 2,044,450 46,738 16,305 109,200 57,206
AT 2006 32,649 32,383 33,511 1,128 - - 862
BE 2006 59,952 54,775 58,372 3,597 - 1,580 -
CY 2006 5,612 5,259 5,328 69 - 284 -
CZ 2006 96,920 83,625 84,183 558 - 12,737 -
DE 2006 495,488 478,017 475,035 - 2,982 20,453 -
DK 2006 27,908 34,200 28,761 - 5,439 - 853
EE 2006 18,200 12,109 12,915 806 - 5,285 -
ES 2006 166,186 179,697 182,983 3,286 - - 16,797
FI 2006 44,618 44,621 37,479 - 7,142 7,139 -
FR 2006 149,967 126,979 133,933 6,954 - 16,034 -
GR 2006 71,162 69,965 74,288 4,323 - - 3,126
HU 2006 30,236 25,846 26,350 504 - 3,886 -
IE 2006 19,238 21,705 23,695 1,990 - - 4,457
IT 2006 205,050 227,439 234,025 6,586 - - 28,975
LT 2006 10,577 6,517 6,820 303 - 3,757 -
LU 2006 3,229 2,713 2,332 - 381 897 -
LV 2006 4,058 2,941 2,924 - 17 1,134 -
MT 2006 2,167 1,986 1,969 - 17 198 -
NL 2006 86,388 76,701 79,455 2,754 - 6,933 -
PL 2006 237,558 209,616 201,960 - 7,656 35,598 -
PT 2006 36,909 33,084 36,880 3,796 - 29 -
SE 2006 22,484 19,889 20,132 243 - 2,352 -
SI 2006 8,692 8,842 9,000 158 - - 308
SK 2006 30,487 25,543 25,158 - 385 5,329 -
UK 2006 206,005 251,160 239,370 - 11,790 - 33,365
EU25 2006 2,071,740 2,035,612 2,036,858 37,057 35,811 123,625 88,743
AT 2007 32,649 31,751 32,642 891 - 7 -
BE 2007 60,429 52,795 56,075 3,280 - 4,354 -
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Country Year Allocated Veriﬁed BAU Abatement Inﬂation Over-all. Under-all.
CY 2007 5,899 5,396 5,424 28 - 475 -
CZ 2007 96,920 87,738 85,569 - 2,169 11,351 -
DE 2007 497,302 487,004 464,588 - 22,416 32,714 -
DK 2007 27,903 29,407 32,146 2,739 - - 4,243
EE 2007 21,344 15,330 12,748 - 2,582 8,596 -
ES 2007 159,717 186,184 177,158 - 9,026 - 17,441
FI 2007 44,620 42,541 44,000 1,459 - 620 -
FR 2007 149,776 126,635 128,475 1,840 - 21,301 -
GR 2007 71,162 72,717 72,268 - 449 - 1,106
HU 2007 30,236 26,835 26,475 - 360 3,761 -
IE 2007 19,240 21,246 22,229 983 - - 2,989
IT 2007 203,255 226,369 230,514 4,145 - - 27,259
LT 2007 10,318 5,999 6,282 283 - 4,036 -
LU 2007 3,229 2,567 2,360 - 207 869 -
LV 2007 4,035 2,849 2,919 70 - 1,116 -
MT 2007 2,286 2,027 1,910 - 118 376 -
NL 2007 86,477 79,875 75,257 - 4,618 11,220 -
PL 2007 237,543 209,602 206,622 - 2,980 30,921 -
PT 2007 36,909 31,183 34,211 3,028 - 2,698 -
SE 2007 22,846 15,348 19,838 4,490 - 3,008 -
SI 2007 8,246 9,049 8,691 - 358 - 445
SK 2007 30,487 24,517 24,734 217 - 5,753 -
UK 2007 215,875 256,581 234,634 - 21,947 - 18,759
EU25 2007 2,078,703 2,051,545 2,007,768 23,453 67,229 143,175 72,241NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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